Eminent Domain, Data Centers, and the Right to Exclude

Overview

The rapid expansion of artificial intelligence (AI) and data centers is creating conflict between economic development and private property rights. These facilities require enormous amounts of electricity, water, and supporting infrastructure, sometimes requiring access to land through eminent domain authority delegated to utilities or other private entities.

A recent case involving a proposed electric transmission line in Maryland could have important implications for that development. In PSEG Renewable Transmission LLC v. Arentz Family, LP,[1] a federal appellate court upheld a preliminary injunction allowing a private transmission developer to enter private property to conduct surveys before receiving the state regulatory approval necessary to exercise eminent domain for construction of the project.

On November 4, 2026, affected landowners asked the United States Supreme Court to review the appellate court’s decision.  The immediate issue is whether a court can use a preliminary injunction to give a private company access to private property when the company has not yet established that it possesses the statutory authority necessary to exercise eminent domain.

Although the case involves an electric transmission project rather than the direct condemnation of property for a data center, the implications extend well beyond Maryland. For agricultural landowners, the case raises an important question: Can the infrastructure demands of private commercial development justify allowing private companies to intrude upon privately owned agricultural property before they have established their legal authority to do so?

The PSEG Dispute

PSEG Renewable Transmission LLC proposed constructing a 67-mile high-voltage transmission line through Baltimore, Carroll, and Frederick Counties in Maryland. The project, known as the Maryland Piedmont Reliability Project, was selected through the regional transmission planning process administered by PJM Interconnection.

Maryland law requires a developer seeking to construct a transmission line to obtain a Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity (CPCN) from the Maryland Public Service Commission. Importantly, Maryland law prohibits the acquisition of property through condemnation for the transmission line until the required certificate has been obtained.[2]

PSEG submitted its application in December 2024. However, Maryland’s Power Plant Research Program determined that the application was administratively incomplete because certain environmental and socioeconomic studies required actual field investigations rather than information obtained from desktop sources.

The route crossed farms, businesses, and properties subject to conservation easements. When owners refused survey access, PSEG sued in April 2025, seeking a preliminary injunction allowing its personnel and surveyors to conduct the required investigations.

The federal district court granted the injunction in June 2025, and the Fourth Circuit affirmed on August 6, 2026.  The Fourth Circuit concluded that PSEG had demonstrated a likelihood of possessing a statutory right of access under Maryland law, even though it had not yet obtained the CPCN necessary to condemn property for construction.

The injunction did not authorize construction or permanent possession. It permitted entry for surveys and field investigations necessary to complete the regulatory application. Nevertheless, PSEG obtained court-ordered access before completing the regulatory process determining whether the project could proceed.

The Preliminary Injunction Problem

Under Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, et al.,[3] a party seeking a preliminary injunction must show a likelihood of success on the merits, likely irreparable harm without relief, that the balance of equities favors relief, and that an injunction serves the public interest.

The Fourth Circuit concluded that PSEG satisfied these requirements. Without access, PSEG could not complete its application or obtain the CPCN, potentially jeopardizing project milestones and causing financial losses. The court considered the landowners’ injuries relatively limited because access was temporary and Maryland law provided a separate remedy for survey-related damages.

The landowners argue that a preliminary injunction should preserve the status quo, not create a substantive right. Because PSEG had not established statutory authority to enter their properties, they contend the injunction gave PSEG a right Maryland’s legislature had not conferred.

The landowners’ argument draws support from Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo, S.A. v. Alliance Bond Fund, Inc.,[4] which addressed limitations on federal equitable jurisdiction, and Northern Border Pipeline Co. v. 86.72 Acres of Land,[5] where the Seventh Circuit rejected the use of preliminary injunctive relief to provide a pipeline company with immediate possession before it had established its entitlement to condemn the property.

The Fourth Circuit also considered whether the injunction was mandatory because it granted substantially the same access PSEG sought in its complaint. Rather than decide whether the injunction altered the status quo, the court concluded that the circumstances were sufficiently demanding to justify mandatory preliminary relief. Relying on its earlier decision in East Tennessee Natural Gas Co. v. Sage,[6] the court emphasized the potential consequences of delaying a major energy infrastructure project.

The distinction is between protecting an existing legal right and judicially creating a right that remains subject to statutory conditions.  If a private company has not yet satisfied the conditions imposed by the legislature for exercising eminent domain, a court should be reluctant to use its equitable powers to provide the practical benefits of that authority.

The Fourth Circuit’s Decision and the Unresolved Statutory Question

The Fourth Circuit did not authorize condemnation before regulatory approval. Instead, the majority interpreted Maryland’s separate pre-condemnation access statute, Md. Code Ann., Real Prop. § 12-111, which permits certain persons acting for the state or entities possessing eminent domain authority to enter property for surveys. The majority concluded that PSEG likely qualified because the regulatory agency required field studies. Judge Richardson concurred in the judgment but took a different statutory path. He concluded that Maryland had likely delegated eminent domain authority to PSEG under the Public Utility Article, although PSEG could not exercise that authority to condemn property until it received the required CPCN. His concurrence emphasized the distinction between possessing eminent domain authority and being legally permitted to exercise it.

The differing interpretations illustrate the importance of statutory language and the limits of delegated authority. The distinction between permission to conduct surveys and the power to condemn property remains central to the dispute.

The Right to Exclude

The dispute implicates the fundamental property right to exclude. In Kaiser Aetna v. United States,[7] the Supreme Court recognized that right as an essential component of ownership. In Cedar Point Nursery v. Hassid,[8] the Court held that a California regulation granting union organizers periodic access to agricultural property constituted a per se physical taking because it appropriated a right to physically invade private property.

The Fourth Circuit also rejected the landowners’ takings argument. It reasoned that Maryland’s statute codified a longstanding common-law right of entry for preliminary surveys and that the limited access authorized by the injunction did not amount to the type of physical invasion addressed in Cedar Point.

Although Cedar Point does not automatically resolve PSEG, it reinforces the importance of the right to exclude. The request of the Supreme Court to take the case involves the question of the statutory authority to enter, rather than the separate constitutional question of whether authorized survey access constitutes a compensable taking.  Nevertheless, unwanted entry can disrupt planting and harvesting, damage drainage or conservation practices, interfere with livestock operations, and create biosecurity concerns. Temporary access does not necessarily mean insignificant interference with property rights.

From Kelo to the Data Center Boom

In Kelo v. City of New London,[9] the Supreme Court held that economic development could constitute a public purpose even when condemned property was transferred to private developers. The decision prompted numerous states to restrict eminent domain for economic development, but questions remain about the boundary between public infrastructure and private benefit.

Data center expansion puts renewed focus on the distinction between public infrastructure and private development. AI facilities can require hundreds of acres, substantial electrical capacity, and significant water resources. Supporting infrastructure may include:

  • High-voltage transmission lines and substations.
  • Natural gas pipelines.
  • Water pipelines and pumping facilities.
  • Wastewater treatment infrastructure.
  • Access roads and other supporting facilities.

A technology company may acquire its data center site through voluntary purchases. However, the transmission lines, water pipelines, and other infrastructure necessary to support the facility may depend on utilities or private developers possessing delegated eminent domain authority.

A private company may not condemn farmland directly but may benefit from condemnation for infrastructure primarily serving its facility. This raises public-use questions, particularly when the infrastructure is dedicated largely to one private development rather than serving a broader electrical grid or water system.

The public-use inquiry should examine the actual function of the project, the public benefits involved, the nature of the infrastructure, and the relationship between the project and its private beneficiaries.  Simply describing infrastructure as a public utility improvement should not end the constitutional inquiry.

The Next Round of Eminent Domain Litigation

Several important questions are likely to arise as data center development accelerates.

  • When does a private company actually acquire eminent domain authority?  Is the authority conferred when the legislature delegates it, when a regulatory agency approves the project, or only when the company satisfies all statutory conditions necessary to condemn a particular property?  PSEG illustrates why this distinction matters.
  • Can preliminary injunctions be used to obtain access before condemnation authority is established?  This is the immediate question before the Supreme Court.  If the Court agrees with the landowners, the decision could establish an important limitation on the use of preliminary injunctions in pre-condemnation proceedings.
  • When does temporary survey access become a compensable taking?  Cedar Point provides an important constitutional framework. Courts will need to consider the duration, frequency, nature, and practical consequences of government-authorized access.
  • What constitutes public use when infrastructure primarily benefits a private data center?  This question could eventually require courts to revisit the practical limits of Kelo. Economic development is relevant, but it should not become a universal justification for transferring private property interests to facilitate private commercial activity.
  • How much deference should courts give administrative agencies?  The Supreme Court’s decision in Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo[10] rejected mandatory Chevron deference to agency interpretations of ambiguous statutes.

Although Loper Bright does not eliminate agency expertise or valid delegations of authority, it reinforces the judiciary’s responsibility to independently interpret statutory limits. An agency’s characterization of a project should not determine the constitutional public-use question.

Conclusion

Expanding transmission capacity, improving grid reliability, and developing infrastructure serve legitimate public interests. But economic development does not eliminate constitutional property protections or statutory limits on delegated condemnation authority.

For agricultural landowners, the consequences can be substantial. Transmission lines may divide farms, interfere with irrigation and machinery operations, complicate livestock management, and restrict future property use. Water pipelines and substations can remove productive agricultural acreage from traditional agricultural production. Moreover, survey access may occur long before an owner has an opportunity to challenge a final condemnation.

PSEG raises questions extending beyond survey access. It concerns the scope of delegated eminent domain authority, the limits of preliminary injunctive relief, and constitutional protections for property owners. As data center development accelerates, courts will increasingly confront the relationship between infrastructure development, private commercial interests, and the Fifth Amendment. Economic benefits do not eliminate the requirement that eminent domain comply with applicable statutes and constitutional limitations.

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[1] 185 F.4th 497 (4th Cir. 2026).

[2] Md. Code Ann., Pub. Util. § 7-207(b)(3)(v)(2).

[3] 555 U.S. 7 (2008).

[4] 527 U.S. 308 (1999).

[5] 144 F.3d 469 (7th Cir. 1998).

[6] 361 F.3d 808 (4th Cir. 2004).

[7] 444 U.S. 164 (1979).

[8] 594 U.S. 139 (2021).

[9] 545 U.S. 469 (2005).

[10] 603 U.S. 369 (2024).